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The law provides that any person injured through the fault of another can claim
monetary compensation in the form of damages.  Restitutio in integrum defines the
objective and measure of damages. Damages in respect of loss of future earnings
comprise the product of an estimated annual loss and an estimated number of years
purchase. Estimates are made by means of intuition and precedent with little reference
to labour economics. Damages calculated under an alternative methodology
incorporating age-earnings profiles and conditional employment rates are compared
with damages awarded in 100 adjudicated cases to reveal systematic and substantial
under-compensation under the court method.
1.  Introduction
The law in England and Wales provides that any person injured through the fault of
another can claim monetary compensation, in the form of damages, for the injuries
sustained. The purpose of damages is compensation (as opposed to punishment,
retribution or deterrence) and the measure of damages is ‘that sum of money which
will put the party that has been injured, or has suffered, in the same position as he
would have been in if he had not sustained the wrong’ (Lord Blackburn 1880).
2
The established principles that determine the amount of damages awarded in respect
of loss of future earnings  is the multiplier–multiplicand method. This involves the
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product of the multiplicand, an estimated annual loss, and the multiplier, an estimated
number of years’ purchase. As described below, estimates are made by means of
intuition and precedent and little attempt is made to incorporate labour market
analysis. This is in contrast to accepted practice in US courts in which the opinion of
labour economists (called forensic economists) are sought to determine the value of
expected loss of future earnings.
The purpose of the present study is to consider whether the approach currently used
by courts in England and Wales to determine loss of future earnings produces awards
that are significantly different to those calculated using a labour economics
methodology. The complexity of the labour economics methodology is constrained by
the requirement that it be accessible to the courts. We draw heavily on the widely
used practices of forensic economists in the US, practices  which are similarly
constrained but nevertheless firmly founded in labour market analysis.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we explain how damages
are determined in the courts in England and Wales using the multiplier–multiplicand
approach. In section 3, we present an overview of the US approach to calculating loss
of earnings. Section 4 details how we have adapted this methodology for use in
personal injury cases in England and Wales. A comparison of the awards calculated
under the different approaches is presented in section 5.
2.  How the Courts Measure Loss of Future Earnings
Damages for loss of future earnings are measured as the capital sum that will fully
compensate the injured party at the time of trial for the stream of earnings in the3
future that would have been available to the claimant in the absence of the injury. The
calculation undertaken uses the multiplier–multiplicand method. An annual loss of
earnings (multiplicand) is multiplied by the number of years between the date of the
trial and the predicted date of retirement (multiplier). The number of years is then
discounted to account for advanced payment and the risk of premature death (i.e.,
before retirement age). Both the multiplicand and the multiplier are unknown at the
time of trial and must be determined by the court.
The mutiplicand represents the difference between the claimant’s earnings before and
after injury. In most cases future pre-injury earnings are the claimant’s earnings at the
time of injury plus any earnings growth to the date of trial. In general, no account is
taken of any potential growth in real earnings after the date of trial. Where the
claimant is not working at the time of injury, due to non-participation, unemployment
or, in the case of injured children, having not yet entered the labour market, the court
imputes a figure for future pre-injury earnings with reference to published average
earnings data such as is available in the New Earnings Survey.
3
Estimating future post-injury earnings is more speculative. In cases where the
claimant is judged to be medically incapable of future employment, no calculation is
required and the full loss of pre-injury earnings is awarded. However, where medical
evidence indicates that the claimant is capable of employment in the future, a partial
loss is awarded and the court must assess the value of future post-injury earnings. If
the claimant is working at the time of trial, future post-injury earnings will be based
                                                
3 The New Earnings Survey is routinely used by personal injury solicitors and we found frequent
references to it both in evidence and in judgements. In fact, the occupational earnings tables (Part D)
are reproduced in the personal injury practice manual (Kemp and Kemp, 1998).4
upon the claimant’s current earnings. If not, the court must impute a value, normally
using average earnings for an occupational group for which the claimant is considered
intellectually and medically capable of fulfilling.
4
The multiplier component converts a future stream of lost income (the multiplicand)
into a lifetime capital sum while discounting for early receipt and the risk of early
death. The practice of the courts is to impose a uniform rate of interest and to use
population mortality rates. Since 1984, the statistical information required to
determine the multiplier has been published by the Government Actuary in the form
of tables of multipliers discounted for life expectancy and by various rates of interest.
These are known as the Ogden Tables.
The multiplier is further reduced to account for ‘pre-injury labour market hazards’
that may have prevented the claimant working continuously until retirement. The
magnitude of this reduction is fairly arbitrary, taking the form of a percentage
deduction determined by the judge. The conventional level of deduction for labour
market risks is around 20 per cent (Luckett and Craner, 1994). In 1994, the Ogden
Tables included actuarially–calculated percentage deductions for pre-injury labour
market risks for broadly defined categories of workers estimated from activity,
unemployment and sickness rates and industrial disputes observed in large scale cross
sections of the labour force from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s (Haberman and
Bloomfield, 1990).
5
                                                
4 For example, the average earnings for lift operators or car park attendants are often used where an
injured male was formerly a manual worker but is only capable of sedentary employment post injury.
5 Haberman and Bloomfield are candid about the deficiencies of their method and consequently their
estimates. Their estimates of future working life assume single life-time transitions into and out of the5
In 1999, in a House of Lords judgement involving three cases of severe injury, the
legal principles and practice relating to the calculation of future loss in personal injury
litigation were changed. Prior to this judgement the multiplier was discounted on the
assumption that the claimant could achieve a risk-free real rate of return of 4.5 per
cent. Subsequently the discount rate was reduced to 3 per cent.
6 In addition, the
authority of the Ogden Tables as a basis for setting the multiplier, established in 1991
only as a post hoc check on conventional multipliers, was upgraded, as were the
supplementary tables detailing labour market deductions, to the status of a starting
point for the determination of the multiplier.
7
The estimation of future employment post-injury is considerably more speculative
than the estimation of future pre-injury employment. Where medical evidence
indicates that the claimant is capable of employment in the future but where the
impact of displacement and/or residual disability is to weaken the claimant’s
competitive position in the labour market, the multiplier–multiplicand formula is
often rejected and damages are awarded as a lump sum figure, the determination of
which is particularly arbitrary.
8 According to conventional principles, the award is
between 6 and 24 months’ earnings (Ritchie 1994)
9 and is invariably lower than one
calculated using the multiplier–multiplicand approach. An award of this kind has
                                                                                                                                           
labour force, unimodal age-specific activity and unemployment rates which are not conditioned upon
previous labour force status. They anticipate an upward bias in expected working life which, on the
basis of comparative work carried out in Denmark, they predict will be of the order of 5 per cent.
6 The Lord Chancellor has since used legislative powers to reduce the rate to 2.5 per cent.
7 “A judge should be slow to depart from the relevant actuarial multiplier on impressionistic grounds”
Lord Lloyd in Wells v. Wells [1999] 1 AC 345 at 379.
8 It has been described as ‘plucking from the air a suitable number of pounds sterling’ (by Lord Justice
Stephenson, 1976 Moeliker v a Reyrolle & Co Ltd [1976] I.C.R. 253.
9 Based upon the ratio of average unemployment rates between the disabled and able-bodied.6
come to be called a ‘Smith v Manchester’ lump sum after the case in which the
principles for such an award were established.
10 A Smith v Manchester award may
also be made in addition to a multiplier–multiplicand award for the loss of future
earnings where, for example, there is an ongoing loss and the possibility of a period of
greater loss. The risk of redundancy and subsequent unemployment are the sorts of
speculative risks that attract a Smith v Manchester award, as are claimants who have
lost the chance of securing earnings in excess of the pre-injury earnings.
3. Assessing Loss of Future Earnings in US Courts
While the calculation of damages in respect of loss of future earnings undertaken by
forensic economists in the US has a firm foundation in labour economics, this does
not mean that there is uniformity in the way that damages are assessed. Indeed, as
Anderson and Roberts (1989) note, methodologies and benchmarks used by US courts
differ markedly.
11 However, the differences that exist primarily reflect a lack of
consensus about the way the key economic variables, such as earnings growth and
expected working life, are measured. There is far more consensus about what the key
economic variables are and that these should form the basis for determining the level
of damages.
                                                
10 In Smith v. Manchester Corporation [1974] 17 K.I.R. 1 C A an award was made to a claimant who,
at the time of trial, was employed on light duties by her pre-injury employer at her pre-injury wage.
There was a risk that she might lose her job in the future and where the effects of her injury would
reduce the prospects of re-employment. The Court of Appeal increased her award for loss of earning
capacity from £300 to £1,000.7
We present a basic framework that describes the methodology employed by US
economists. The intention is not to provide a wide-ranging review of the many
individual practices used. Rather, the discussion is guided by the need to identify a
methodology that could be applied in personal injury cases in England and Wales.
This methodology replicates the most widely used practices employed in US personal
injury cases, while recognising that the labour market data available in the UK are
different to those in the US and that there is perhaps a greater reluctance on the part of
courts in England and Wales to embrace statistical or econometric analysis.
A Methodological Framework
The model that underpins expert opinion in US personal injury cases is the human
capital theory of wage determination where an individual’s earnings are positively
related to the stock of human capital. Age-earnings profiles are widely used to
represent the effect of additional experience and training on earnings (see, for
example, Bryan and  Linke, 1988; Lane and  Glennon, 1985; Gilbert, 1994, 1997;
Thornton et al, 1997). Technological change, general economic conditions and cohort
effects also affect the path of future earnings (Rodgers et al, 1996) and are included in
an average figure for economy-wide earnings growth.
The following formula is used to represent expected future earnings over an
individual's working life expressed in present value terms,
                                                                                                                                           
11 The variety of practices used by economists in the US is evidenced by two surveys of prevailing
methodologies among members of the National Association of Forensic Economists (Brookshire and
Slesnick, 1997)8
             (1)
Wj denotes the wage an individual receives at each age (j) over a T-year working life.
Wj varies from year to year due to increases in individual productivity resulting from
additional training and experience. The growth rate ( gi) represents the combined
effects of average productivity growth over time and possible cohort effects. ri is the
real discount rate used to obtain the capitalised value the stream of earnings. Use of a
real discount rate avoids the need to adjust earnings growth for the possible effects of
inflation. The formula highlights the key variables to be estimated. First, how should
Wj and gi be measured? Second, how should the length of working life over which the
earnings stream is calculated be measured?
Measuring Wage Growth
Two sources of wage growth are identified. First, Wj increases or decreases with age,
reflecting changes in an individual's stock of human capital and therefore his/her level
of productivity. This component of wage growth is obtained from sex- and education-
specific age-earnings profiles. These profiles are measured either by computing the
average earnings of cohorts of workers at each age, or at various age intervals, often
disaggregated by education level, or by estimating earnings functions that relate
individual earnings to a vector of personal characteristics including a measure of age
or labour market experience. Within the simple cross-sections of earnings and

























(CPS) in the US, or the Labour Force Survey (LFS) in Britain), little more can be
done than to take the implied growth in earnings across each cross-section as
corresponding to the likely earnings path over each individual’s work horizon. The
use of cross section data to measure age-earnings profiles, a longitudinal
phenomenon, typically generate inverted U-shaped profiles which under-predict the
growth of earnings at younger ages and over-predict the decline in earnings of older
workers (Murphy and Welch, 1990).
Age-earnings profiles constructed using the mean earnings of workers at each age
produce profiles that are erratic Gilbert (1994, 1997). Estimated mean earnings
increase and decrease as one moves from one age to another, thereby contradicting the
underlying theory. Smoother profiles are obtained by using mean earnings calculated
for age intervals though this is at the cost of less accurate estimates. The alternative is
to estimate empirical earnings functions but this requires that one  specifies an
appropriate functional form that approximates the way earnings vary with years of
experience. The most widely used is a quadratic specification, though more recent
evidence for the US suggests that fourth degree polynomials provide better
approximations of earnings profiles. However, these too under-predict earnings at
each end of an individual’s working life.
Forensic economists have explored the use of longitudinal data in the estimation of
future earnings. Results reported by Thornton et al (1997) show that earnings profiles
estimated using longitudinal data do not have the inverted U-shape typically found
using cross-section data but that earnings profiles continue to rise until retirement.
However, using both CPS cross-section data and panel data from the US to compare10
age earnings profiles for male and female high school and college graduates, Rodgers
et al (1996) find that the forecasts of the present value of earnings for young workers
using both data sets are very close.
A second source of earnings growth, gi, is economy-wide and reflects changes in
general economic conditions. In effect, gi shifts the age-earnings profile over time.
Measures of  gi  are typically based on historical data for movements in average
economy-wide earnings. Estimates of gi tend to be in the region of 1 - 2 per cent per
annum (in real terms), though these vary by education, gender and race (Nelson and
Patton, 1993;  Mullett et al, 1990). Ignoring this, albeit small, annual growth rate
substantially understates an individual's  life time loss of earnings.  Gohmann  et al
(1998) show that the present value of an earnings stream for a 20 year old man would
be 24 per cent less if no adjustment is made for the growth in real average earnings.
Similarly, Gilbert (1997) reports that the total lifetime earnings of a  25 year old
college graduate would be 7 per cent higher when adjusted for the long term growth
in earnings of college graduates. For people with lower levels of education, Gilbert
finds that expected real average earnings have declined over time.
Measuring expected working life.
The most commonly used practice in the US involves the use of  worklife tables
published by the Bureau of  Labor Statistics (BLS) (Smith, 1982). These tables
provide an estimate of worklife expectancy (the number of years an individual of a
stated age is expected to remain in the workforce until final separation either because
of retirement or death). The BLS tables are calculated using the probabilities of
movement into and out of the labour force for people of a particular age. Information11
on current earnings and expected earnings growth are then used to calculate the value
of loss of future earnings over the expected the number of years of  worklife
expectancy.
However, the use of  worklife expectancy tables does not produce the correct
mathematical expectation of future earnings (Alter and Becker, 1985). The sum of an
income stream estimated over the length of an expected working life is not the same
as the sum of expected annual earnings over an individual's working life. Two
methods have been proposed to estimate expected annual earnings using the correct
mathematical expectation. The first simply weights each annual earnings figure by the
probability of being active and alive at each age. These weights do not reflect a
person's past labour force behaviour or status and are thus biased estimates of the
conditional probabilities of future labour market activity (Alter and Becker, 1985).
Alter and Becker provide an alternative methodology based on age-specific transition
probabilities. To illustrate the Alter-Becker methodology, consider the expected
earnings of someone at age j. This can be measured as,
E(Wj) = [(Wj. Paaj. Pswj. Psj) + (0.5. Wj. Paaj. Plwj. Psj) +
             (0.5. Wj. Paaj. Pswj. Pdj) + (0.5. Wj. Panj. Pewj. Psj)] (2)
where E(Wj) is expected earnings at age j, Paaj  is the probability of being alive and in
the workforce, Panj is the probability of being alive and not in the workforce, Pswj is
the probability of staying in the workforce,  Plwj is the probability of leaving the
workforce, Pewj is the probability of entering the workforce, Psj is the probability of12
surviving the year and  Pdj   is the probability of dying during the year. The
methodology assumes that Wj is made in two equal biannual payments during the year
and that someone who changes labour market status or dies does so half way through
the year.
Although, the use of transition probabilities to estimate expected annual earnings is
theoretically superior to the use of  worklife expectancy tables, it is computationally
more costly and is less accessible to the courts. Given the cost, it is an important
question whether or not the approach based on transition probabilities produces
estimates of the loss of future earnings that are different to BLS  worklife
expectancies. Using numerical examples for men and women at ages 30, 45 and 60
years, Schieren (1993) demonstrates similarity between both estimates and this might
explain why the more straightforward worklife expectancy tables are preferred in US
trials.
4.  An Alternative Methodology for Courts in England and Wales
This alternative method of calculation draws heavily on those practices commonly
used in the US and uses age-earnings profiles and employment probabilities to
determine the expected future path of earnings. Base earnings are measured as the
actual earnings of the claimant at the time of trial. In those cases where pre-injury
earnings are not known (such as cases involving children and inactive persons), we
have used the earnings figure determined by the court. To obtain the present value of
the earnings stream, we have used the court-determined discount rate.13
Measuring Lifetime Earnings Functions: Age-Earnings Profiles
The basic premise of the labour market approach to determining loss of future
earnings is that the path of future earnings growth depends upon how earnings
increase with age (the age-earnings profile) and on the growth in the level of average
earnings over time. The age-earnings profile is estimated by regressing earnings on
experience holding constant such characteristics as education and sex. The non-linear
shape of the age-earnings profile is approximated by a polynomial of sufficiently high
degree in the number of years of experience. Although Murphy and Welch (1990)
advocate the use of a quartic or a cubic specification over the use of the standard
quadratic in order to minimise the down-turn in earnings for workers in their fifties,
our own analysis for the UK, along the same lines suggests that the quadratic provides
the best approximation of the earnings profile. Quartic and cubic formulations do not
improve the overall explanatory power of the estimated earnings functions.
Disability and Earnings.
Where the claimant is able to work after injury, but where the amount and type of
work is affected by displacement and/or residual disability, this must be reflected in
the award of damages. The proposed methodology is amended to estimate the post-
injury earnings stream for such claimants.
Whilst obtaining accurate survey information on some characteristics, such as
education or gender, is reasonably straightforward, self-reported health assessments
are subjective and therefore less reliable. Typically, questionnaires ask whether poor
health limits the amount or kind of paid work an individual can perform, and then,
how a respondent would rate their health in terms of excellent, very good, good, fair14
or poor.  The problems that arise from these questions come from, first, their
subjective element which it makes very difficult to compare responses.
12  Secondly,
responses may not be independent of labour market outcomes. The problem is
compounded by survey questionnaires that only collate data on disability conditional
on such disability limiting the amount of work an individual can do, (as in the LFS).
Work, wages and disability may be determined simultaneously.  Thirdly, a break from
continuous employment due to poor health often has less social stigma than being
unemployed or looking after children.  Some survey respondents may be more
inclined to cite a health reason for economic inactivity to rationalise their behaviour.
Fourthly, there are financial incentives to record poor health in order to qualify for
certain benefits.
13  Measurement error in any variable that seeks to capture disability
will lead to under-estimates of the impact of health on labour force participation and
earnings. Further, the potential endogeneity of self-reported health on labour market
status could lead to biased estimates of the impact of other economic variables on
participation, whether or not the impact of health has been measured correctly.
Typically, data on disability do not distinguish individuals who have been disabled as
a result of injury from those who have had the same or similar disability from birth. It
may well be the case that people with a congenital disability are more able to adapt,
and thereby fare better in the labour market, than someone who is faced with a
disability following a sudden injury.
                                                
12 For example, British data contains a high proportion of workers who suffer from back problems.
The severity of these range across a wide spectrum and alter the type and intensity of work which
individuals can perform.
13 Walker and Thompson (1996) focus on the issue of disability and receipt of welfare payments. One
of their findings is that losing a disability is not symmetric with acquiring one in terms of subsequent
labour market outcomes.15
Kidd et al (1998) work with a self-reported health variable in the second and fourth
quarters of the 1996  LFS.  Their work is embedded within the literature on
discrimination inasmuch as they attempt to decompose the differences in the labour
market fortunes of disabled and able-bodied men into differences in human-capital
endowments and differences associated with actual productivity.  By estimating a
probit model on the probability of labour market participation, they retrieve a sample
selectivity correction  parameter which is then included in a typical least squares
earnings function for the separate samples.  They conclude that actual differences in
productivity between their two groups of male workers account for some 50 per cent
of the wage and participation rate differences. However, they find little justification
for the inclusion of sample selectivity correction techniques in their results.
In  Blackaby  et al (1998), also using  LFS, employment differentials between the
disabled and able-bodied workers are found to be more significant than earnings
differentials. They report a typical earnings gap between disabled and able-bodied
men of around 13 per cent. The aggregate employment rate differential between able-
bodied and disabled men is around 20 per cent, although this varies with disability
type.
Walker and Thompson (1996), using three-year longitudinal data and a dichotomous
self-reported disability variable highlighting a scarring effect of disability. Even when
a worker has recovered from a temporary disability, there is evidence of its history on
the worker’s future labour market outcomes. This scarring effect on wages is16
important given that the majority of claimants are medically capable of returning to
work.
14
Data on Earnings and Disability
We use data on earnings and earnings-related characteristics from LFS 1996–7.
From a sample of 45,000 men and women for whom we have pay information, 4,000
are disabled and in work. The disability variable is derived from questions relating to
the health-related problem as reported by respondents. All potentially economically
active men and women are asked if they have poor health or a disability that limits the
amount or kind of paid work that they can do. Although individuals are able to cite up
to 15 types of health problems, we use a simple dichotomous variable which flags an
individual as having specified any work-limiting ailments in the health section. Our
disability variable is set equal to one if a disability occurs.
Age-Earnings Profiles: Results
The empirical model used to estimate age-earnings profiles model is,
ln Wi = a1 + a2 D i+ a3 D i Xi + a4 D i Xi
2
  + b Xi + b Xi 
2+ c zi + ui (3)
where Wi is the weekly wage, D iis a dichotomous variable that takes the value 1 if
the person is disabled, otherwise it is 0, Xi is years of work experience, zi is a vector
of control variables including marital status, education and region of residence and ui
is a random disturbance term. This equation is estimated for six separate occupation
                                                
14 Ruhm (1991) finds a scarring effect for displaced able-bodied workers four years after displacement
mirrored by their wages which were 10 – 13 per cent below those of continuous workers.17
groups and for men and women. These are then used to predict weekly wages and
wage growth by years of experience. The estimates of wage growth are generated by
subtracting the wage at experience level  t from the wage at t+1 and subsequently
dividing this figure by the wage at t.
Measuring Employment Probabilities
In order to obtain estimates of expected future earnings, the annual earnings stream
derived using an appropriate age-earnings profile has to be weighted by the
probability that an individual will be in employment at each age until final separation.
The most widely used approach employed by forensic economists in the US is to
estimate the number of years over which the stream of future earnings is summed,
based on the government worklife expectancy tables. Equivalent worklife expectancy
tables are not available for England and Wales and so two alternative methodologies
were considered. The first simply uses unconditional employment probabilities (the
number of people of a stated age in employment/ the total number of people of that
age). Data to calculate employment probabilities in this way are available from the
LFS. The second approach is that proposed in Alter and Becker (1985). This uses
transition probabilities between different activity statuses to obtain the likelihood of
being in employment at each age, conditional on activity status at injury and age at
trial. It provides a more appropriate basis for calculating employment probabilities
and is the one recommended by Haberman and Bloomfield (1990).
The LFS provides information for each person on current activity status and the
individual's activity status 12 months earlier. To estimate transition probabilities (for
someone initially in employment) we calculate the likelihood that someone of a stated18
age who was in employment 12 months ago is still in employment, the likelihood that
someone in employment has become unemployed and the likelihood of becoming
inactive. Let EEage   denote the number remaining employed, EUage,  the number who
become unemployed and EIage the number who become inactive,
 15 then
EEage   = [number of people of a given age currently in employment who were in
employment 12 months previously / number of people in employment 12 months
previously]
EUage   = [number of people of a given age currently unemployed who were in
employment 12 months previously / number of people in employment 12 months
previously]
EIage  = [number of people of a given age currently inactive who were in employment
12 months previously  / number of people in employment 12 months previously]
These transition probabilities have been used to estimate employment probabilities for
each age conditional on activity status at injury and age at trial. Consider 1000 people
aged 25 years who were in employment aged 24 years. The number employed at age
25 years is equal to 1000.EE25 , the number unemployed will be equal to 1000.EU25 and
the number inactive is equal to 1000.EI25.  . Suppose that 950 of the 1000 people
employed at age 24 years are still in employment, 40 have become unemployed and
10 have become inactive. It is now possible to estimate the expected number of
people currently aged 25 years who will to be in employment at age 26 years. This
                                                
15 We use the first letter to denote activity status twelve months ago and the second to denote current19
will be equal to (950.EE26 + 40.UE26 + 10.IE26 ). The number of people unemployed at
age 26 years is expected to be (950 EU26 + 40.UU26 + 10.IU26  ) and the number of
people inactive (950.EI26 + 40.UI26 + 10.II26 ).
This process can be continued until final separation age. Dividing the number of
people in employment at each age by 1000 gives an inflow weighted employment
probability conditional on activity status at injury and age at trial. Employment
probabilities were calculated in this way for males and females, able-bodied and
disabled and by activity status for all starting ages.  The volume of material
documenting the estimated employment probabilities (12 tables each containing 50
columns) precludes useful commentary. We would note that although the estimated
employment probabilities were different from those derived using the proportion of
people currently in employment at each age, the differences were not sufficiently
large to be of concern.
Perhaps the most critical assumption made in these calculations is that the likelihood
of someone now aged, say 40 years, who was in employment one year ago and is still
in employment need not be the same as that faced in 15 years time by someone who is
currently aged 25 years. Unfortunately, there is little that can be done in the present
context to control for such cohort effects.  The proposed methodology is preferable to
one simply based on current activity rates (which would also face the problem of
cohort effects) since it captures the dynamic nature of the labour force and the
relationship between current activity status and previous activity status.
                                                                                                                                           
status.20
The Alternative Calculation
For each individual, we use the court-determined level of earnings at time of trial as a
measure of base earnings. The future path of earnings is then projected using the
appropriate growth rate series to derive Wj over the claimant’s remaining working life.
In addition to individual earning growth, we include an allowance of 2 per cent per
annum for the effects of economy-wide factors. To obtain an expected future earnings
path, the earnings figure at each age is then weighted by the age- and activity status-
specific probability of being in employment (EPj). For comparative purposes, we also
undertake the calculation using unconditional employment rates. In those cases that
involve post-injury earnings potential, a Wj series is also derived using age-earnings
profiles for disabled workers. The net wage used to predict loss of earnings is then the
difference between the two profiles. The capitalised value of the resulting earnings
stream is then obtained by discounting by the real rate of discount used by the court in
each case (usually 4.5 per cent).
5.  A Comparison of the Alternative Methodologies.
The application of the alternative method to a set of 100 adjudicated cases, and a
comparison of the level of compensation awarded using each method of calculation,
indicates that claimants are under-compensated under the court method. We find that
87 per cent of claimants in the sample are under-compensated by the court method.
Half of those who are under-compensated would have received an award at least 50
per cent greater under the alternative calculation and for, 17 per  cent, the award
calculated by the alternative method was at least double the court award. We
anticipate that the difference will be non-uniformly distributed across the sample of21
claimants. It will be greater for men, younger claimants and those with post-injury
earnings potential. It is the young who have more years of potential employment, and
thus earnings growth, ahead of them. For women, the absence of compensation for
earnings growth is offset by the absence of any allowance for the effects of childcare-
based periods of inactivity on future employment rates and earnings growth. Those
claimants who are deemed medically capable of work after injury will be particularly
under-compensated because  Smith v Manchester awards fail to reflect adequately
post-injury employment risks.
In Table 1 the LFS-based estimates of loss of future earnings are compared to the
level of compensation awarded by the court. The court award in the first column is
compared first with an award calculated on the basis of a strict application of the
Ogden Tables and subsequently with the alternative awards. We report the ratio of the
alternative award to the court award separately for men and women claimants and for
those who were judged to have post-injury earnings potential for the court award.
Alternative 2 is based upon individual age-related earnings growth from equation (3)
and unconditional age-specific employment rates. Alternative 3 is based upon the
individual age-related earnings growth in Alternative 2 and age-specific conditional
employment rates. Alternative 4 is Alternative 2 with the addition economy-wide
earnings growth, estimated at 2 per cent per annum.
Table 1
For the sample as a whole, the ratio using Alternative 4, which includes both
individual and economy-wide earnings growth, is 1.57. In cases where injury does not22
preclude future earnings, the differential between the alternative and court award is
particularly large. This reflects the failure of  Smith v Manchester awards to fully
compensate the claimant for future competitive disadvantage in the labour market.
This is an important difference between the alternative method of calculation and the
method currently used by the courts. In contrast to a lump sum payment in the range
of 6–24 months post-injury earnings, the estimation of age- and status-specific post-
injury risks to both employment and earnings are an integral part of the alternative
calculation.
Where there is no post-injury earning potential, the court and alternative awards are
much closer. In fact, where the alternative award is based upon individual but not
economy-wide earnings growth (Alternative 3) there is no difference between the
court and the alternative award. The explanation for this lies in the different
approaches to the calculation of pre-injury labour market risks. The employment rates
implied by the Ogden deductions (increasingly used by the courts even before 1999)
are significantly higher than the employment rates used in the alternative calculation
which are based upon transition probabilities in the LFS. It just so happens that on
average the lower pre-injury employment rates used in the alternative calculation
more or less offset the extra compensation for individual age-related lifetime earnings
growth.
Contrary to expectations, women and men claimants appear to be are equally under-
compensated under the court method. Although the courts’ fail to make sufficient
allowance for earnings growth over an individual's working life (for both men and
women), there is an offsetting effect for women because in general the courts do not23
reduce life-time employment rates to account for women’s disproportionate
responsibilities in respect of childcare. In contrast, women’s lower participation rates
are reflected in the LFS transition probabilities upon which the employment rates used
in the alternative calculations are based. This unexpected result may be due to the
effects of age. Women in the sample are younger than men and the ratio increases
with remaining working years.
Since 96 per cent of claimants of working age were employed at the time of injury,
the expectation is that future earnings calculated on the basis of conditional
employment rates (Alternative 3) will exceed those based upon unconditional
employment rates (Alternative 2). This result is confirmed by comparing Alternative 3
and Alternative 2.
Given that the effect of closer adherence to the Ogden Tables since 1999 has been to
increase court awards, it is interesting to compare the court awards made prior to this
date with the award which would have resulted from a strict application of the Ogden
Tables. The ratio between the Ogden and the court awards is greater than unity
because the courts have conventionally applied a greater deduction for non-mortality
risks than those reported in the Ogden Tables. The difference is lower for women
claimants because the Ogden Tables make greater allowance for lower  life-time
inactivity rates for women.
In Table 2 we use a multivariate framework to investigate potential correlates of the
difference between the court and alternative methods of calculation. The dependent
variables is the ratio between alternative 4 (based upon individual age-earnings24
profiles, average economy-wide earnings growth and conditional employment
probabilities) and the court award. The purpose is to identify any systematic patterns
of under-compensation. In column ( i) we see that the ratio increases with the
claimant’s potential remaining years in the labour market. This reflects the fact that
the courts’ methodology for determining the loss of future earnings makes no
allowance for earnings growth over an individual’s working life. This result is robust
to the inclusion of other variables. In column (ii) we include a variable measuring
whether or not the claimant has post-injury earnings potential. The ratio is greater for
those with post-injury earnings potential, holding constant the number of potential
years in the labour market. This is because the court method of using a  Smith v
Manchester lump sum payment fails to adequately account for the impact of
displacement and/or continuing disability on post-injury earnings. Again this result is
robust to changes in included explanatory variables.
Table 2
We introduce individual earnings-related characteristics in columns (iii) and (iv). As
predicted, the impact of being male is to increase the differential between the
alternative and court award. Ethnicity has no impact. Being under 16 years of age at
the time of injury, and thus without an established record in the labour market, does
not significantly increase the differential. Under-compensation is less for clerical
workers, perhaps because the displacement effects following injury are less than for
manual workers. This is consistent with the impact of qualifications. Where the
claimant’s highest qualifications were achieved at school, displacement effects, and
thus the differential, are likely to be greater.25
Case characteristics appear to have little impact on the size of the differential in
column (v). The main exceptions are some evidence of a regional effect, the
differential is lower in London compared to the other regions, and the differential is
lower for awards made in County Courts than in the higher courts. There is no
independent impact of the size of award on the differential.
6. Conclusions
This paper proposes an alternative method for the calculation of loss of future
earnings following personal  injury which has its foundation in the principles and
practice of labour economics. While constrained by the requirement that any
alternative method must be accessible to the courts and amenable to the routine
application of standard spread sheet calculations, the alternative method incorporates
the advancement of earnings over the claimant’s remaining working life weighted by
age-specific and activity status-conditioned employment rates.
The extent to which the alternative method would make a difference in practice is
illustrated in a comparison of damages for loss of future earnings with those from a
sample of court-adjudicated cases. In order to identify the impact of the central
components of the alternative method, namely age-earnings profiles and conditional
employment probabilities, the other variables in the calculation, base earnings,
discount rate and mortality rates are those used by the courts.26
The ratio of alternative awards to the court award is generally greater than one,
indicating that the courts do not fully compensate injured claimants for loss of future
earnings. The source of under-compensation is two-fold: first, the multiplier–
multiplicand method fails to account for earnings growth over the claimant’s working
life and, secondly, Smith v Manchester awards fail to compensate sufficiently for the
competitive disadvantage following displacement and/or residual disability.
Furthermore, the differential is not uniformly distributed across the sample of
claimants. It is most significant for men, for younger claimants and for those with
post-injury earning potential.
The acceptance of the Ogden Tables is hailed by the legal profession as a major
advance towards a more ‘scientific’ approach to the assessment of damages. While
these tables encourage a more systematic, consistent and transparent approach to the
calculation of loss of future earnings, they do no more than support the existing
multiplier–multiplicand method. In particular, they do not address the absence of
compensation for earnings growth or the arbitrary and insufficient nature of Smith v
Manchester awards as compensation for post-injury disadvantage in the labour
market. Within the context of the accepted aims of the damages award in tort, the
court method fails to fully compensate claimants for their loss of future earnings.27
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Table 1 Loss of future earnings: A comparison of Court and Alternative awards











Total Sample 100 104,268 - 1.16 1.21 1.57
With post-injury potential earnings 55 78,238 - 1.34 1.37 1.74
Without post-injury potential earnings 45 136,081 1.10 0.93 1.01 1.36
Males 78 109,296 - 1.20 1.23 1.54
Males with post-injury potential earnings 48 77,852 - 1.36 1.37 1.70
Males without post-injury potential earnings 30 159,607 1.12 0.96 1.01 1.28
Females 22 86,439 - 1.00 1.13 1.67
Females with post-injury potential earnings 7 80,890 - 1.30 1.38 2.03
Females without post-injury potential earnings 15 89,029 1.04 0.85 1.01 1.51
Notes:
Alternative (1) Ogden award (not applicable where the claimant has post injury earnings potential)
Alternative (2) actual earnings growth, unconditional employment rates
Alternative (3) actual earnings growth conditional employment rates
Alternative (4) actual earnings growth conditional employment rates plus annual economy-wide growth30
Table 2 Determinants of Differential between Court Awards and Alternative
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
Constant 0.931 (6.987)*** 0.783 (5.554)*** 0.966 (5.479)*** 0.649 (1.282) 1.4714 (2.487)**
Remaining years to retirement 0.028 (5.521)*** 0.027 (5.377)*** 0.024 (4.252)*** 0.025 (4.189)*** 0.023 (3.099)***
Post-injury earning potential - 0.328 (2.621)*** 0.429 (3.143)*** 0.371 (2.630)*** 0.420 (2.436)**
Male - - -0.246 (-1.602)* -0.390 (-2.265)** -0.160 (-0.812)
Black - - -0.092 (-0.457) 0.001 (0.003) -0.153 (-0.623)
Under 16 years at injury 0.268 (1.000) 0.668 (1.354) 0.371 (0.712)
Pre-injury occupation
Professional/managerial - - 0.182 (0.434) -0.282 (-0.282)
Craft manual - - 0.711 (1.502) -0.007 (-0.015)
Clerical - - -0.299 (-1.630)* -0.981 (-1.652)*
Other non manual - - 0.434 (0.961) 0.002 (0.005)
Semi-and un-skilled manual - - 0.414 (0.989) -0.105 (-0.213)
Highest qualification
School - - 0.431 (1.655)* 0.614 (2.085)**
Higher Education - - 0.004 (0.140) 0.163 (0.544)
Vocational - - 0.031 (0.173) 0.075 (0.413)
Region
South - - -0.603 (-2.840)***
South West - - -0.243 (-0.934)
Midlands - - -0.514 (-1.961)**
North - - -0.023 (-0.977)
Wales - - 0.087 (0.359)
Source of injury
Industrial disease - - -0.116 (-0.461)
Road traffic - - -0.124 (-0.723)
Clinical negligence - - -0.09 (-0.325)
Other - - -0.153 (-0.427)
Court
County Court - - -0.362 (-1.843)*
Court of Appeal - - 0.078 (0.439)
House of Lords - - 0.353 (1.085)
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority - - 0.734 (1.348)
Damages for loss of future earnings *100000 - -0.161 (0.088)31
Observations 100 100 100 100 100
R
2 0.23 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.39
F-statistic 30.48*** 19.60*** 8.66*** 4.33*** 3.29***
Notes:   Dependent variable Alternative award 4 / Court award
t statistics in parentheses
*** indicates significant at 1 per cent level ** indicates significant at 5 per cent level * indicates significant at 10 per cent level
Reference categories: no pre-injury occupation, no qualification, London, accident at work, High Court1